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compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,'
which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the
and seizure'
question as to what is an 'unreasonable search
2
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 1
Therefore, by impyling that the Fourth Amendment which regulates
federal action, applied only to criminal proceedings, the Court was
then able to decide that the civil health laws were likewise not protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amndment.
Coinciding with this constitutional trend, a new problem will probably present itself-the need for a clearer deliniation between civil
and criminal proceedings. The Boyd case, cited by the majority opinion
in the Frank decision, held that the proceedings involved, though civil
in name, were criminal in nature and that the Fourth Amendment was
still applicable to this "quasi criminal" action.2 2 Therefore, it is likely
that civil actions which provide for penalties and forfeitures, will be
given a "quasi criminal" label in order to secure the traditional protection of the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment as
embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment.
RICHARD

C.

NINNEMAN

Labor Law: Authority of Arbitrator to Determine Remedy for
Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement-The union sued under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act' for specific
performance of the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining
agreement. The basic grievance resulted from a foreman's denial to
an employee of four hours' overtime work to which the employee
was allegedly entitled by reason of his job classification. The company offered to give the aggrieved employee four hours' overtime
work but refused, in accordance with its established policy, to pay
for work not performed. The company proposal was unsatisfactory
to the union, which invoked arbitration. The company agreed to
arbitrate the issue of whether a contract violation occurred, provided that the remedy for the violation be the subject of negotiation
between the company and the union and not fixed by the arbitrator.
On appeal to the court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held: com21

Id. at 808, citing Boyd v. United States, supra,note 19, at 633.

"We are also clearly of the opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose
of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal ....
The information, though technically a civil proceeding, is in substance
As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures,
and fect a criminal one ....
incurred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi
criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution,
.. " Bovd v. United States, supra, note 19, at 633-634.
'61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §185 (1952).
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pany is required to proceed with arbitration of the issue of work
assignment, but arbitrator's authority is limited to a determination
of that issue alone and not to the formulation of any penalty or the
fixing of damages. Refinery Employees v. Continental Oil co.,
, 44 LRRM 2388 (5th Cir. 1959).
F. 2d
The union conceded on appeal that the court had the authority to
determine the arbitrability of the grievance 2 but contended that the
court could not restrict the arbitration to the issue of whether there
was a violation of the contract and could not prohibit an award of
damages. The court pointed out that arbitration has its basis in the
consent of the parties and that specific performance of a contract to
arbitrate cannot be ordered unless it is first determined that defendant
has broken his promise to arbitrate. The court reasoned that the
decision that the defendant has broken his promise to arbitrate requires a definition of the issue sought to be arbitrated and a determination that the defendant promised to submit that issue to arbitration. 3
Having thus outlined the two tasks confronting it, the court quickly
disposed of the first by finding the real dispute which the union desired
to arbitrate to be the question of whether the company should pay for
time not worked as a penalty to discourage future violations. 4 The
underlying controversy as to the correctness of the overtime work
assignment was not, the court felt, the real matter in dispute.5
In deciding that it was not the intent of the company and the union
to submit to arbitration the question of a penalty for misassignment of
work, the court considered three features of the collective bargaining
agreement: the narrow arbitration clause,0 the reservation of the
2

It appears well settled that the question of arbitrability is to be determined
by the court. Cf. Engineers Ass'n. v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 251 F. 2d
133, 41 LRRM 2272 (2d Cir. 1957); Machinists Ass'n. v. Cameron Iron
Works, 257 F. 2d 467, 42 LRRM 2431 (5th Cir. 1958) cert. denied 358 U.S.
880; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F. 2d 624, 43 LRRM
2757 (6th Cir. 1959). The court must determine whether the contract puts
the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator and if so order arbitration which
will include a decision on arbitrability. United Electrical Workers v. General
Electric Co., 233 F. 2d 85 at 101, 38 LRRM 2019 (1st Cir. 1956) aff'd. 353

U.S. 547 (1957).
3 See Engineers, A.F.L. v. General Electric Co., 250 F. 2d 922, 41 LRRM 2247

(1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 938.
4The serious dispute was whether the Company should pay what in effect is a

penalty and is contrary to its policy against payment for work not performed,
in the absence of a provision in the contract awarding damages or requiring
payment for work not performed. Refinery Employees v. Continental Oil Co.,

-F. 2d-, 44 LRRM 2388 at 2390 (5th Cir. 1959) ... this Court is not passing
on any remedy the aggrieved employee or the Union may have for misassigned overtime work. That issue is not before us. Id., 44 LRRM at 2396.

5 The company admitted its error at one point in the grievance procedure and
consistently offered to provide four hours overtime work for the aggrieved

employee. Id., 44 LRRM at 2389 and 2390.

6 "Only differences relating to the interpretation or the performance" of the
agreement were to be submitted to arbitration. The court contrasted this

language with the wide-open clauses providing for the arbitration of any
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union's right to strike during the term of the agreement, 7 and the
absence of a clause empowering the arbiters to provide a remedy or
impose a penalty. This led the court to the conclusion that the contract
did not expressly require the company to arbitrate the matter of damages. The three features of the collective bargaining agreement outlined above, the provisions establishing remedies for company violations of various sections of the contract but not for misassignment of
overtime" and the fact that no fixed standard was established for such
assignment," induced the court to conclude that the authority to make
an award was not implied. Although the court made only passing
reference to the fact that the contract did not contain an absolute prohibition against strikes, the usual quid pro quo for a broad arbitration
clause, 10 that fact seems particularly persuasive that the company did
not intend to arbitrate its monetary liability or punishment and that
such a submission should not be implied."
In further support of its conclusion that the power of the arbitrator
to fix a penalty was not implied in the collective bargaining agreement,
the court relied on a New York case 12 precluding arbitrators from
making a damage award under an arbitration clause similar to the one
used by the company and the union in the case at the bar.' 3 Several
state and federal cases were cited in support of the proposition that
damages are not arbitrable in the absence of clear contractual language
so providing. 4
The importance of the Continental Oil case seems to lie in its holding that the arbitrator's authority is dependent upon the intent of the
dispute arising under the collective bargaining agreement. Id., 44 LRRAI at
2392.
7 The union promised, however, to refrain from causing work stoppages until
the grievance procedure had been exhausted and thereafter until sixty days
after a majority of the employees had approved the strike by secret vote.
Id., 44 LRRM at 2392, n. 8.
"Nowhere in Section 8 is there any provision for a penalty or for damages
,
for a misassignment. But a remedy is expressly provided or probably implied
in other sections of the contract, such as those dealing with vacations, jury
duty, severance pay, annuities, and funeral leaves." Id., 44 LRRM at 2395.
9 The section dealing with overtime stated the intent of the company "to equalize overtime .. .insofar as it may be practical" but imposed no absolute obligation and made no reference to damages or other remedy. Id., 44 LRRM
at 2396.
10 "Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957).
"1The principle contended for by the union would require the company to arbitrate the proper penalty yet leave the union free to attempt to force a greater
penalty through a strike.
12 Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
a3The arbitrators sought to resolve a commercial dispute by awarding close to
$1,000,000 as consequential damages.
14 There is eminent authority to the contrary. See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482 at 1494 (1959); Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v.
United Textile Workers, 233 F. 2d 104 at 107, 38 LRRM 2033 (1st Cir. 1956),
aff'd. 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
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parties and not upon a court's idea of the public policy with respect to
arbitration of labor disputes. 15 Inherent in the decision is the notion
that the intent of the parties must be gleaned from an examination of
the collective bargaining agreement. Unfortunately, there are few, if
any, well established rules of construction which would aid a court in
this task since the body of substantive law spoken in Lincoln Mills"0 is
not yet fashioned. To apply the rule of construction contended for by
the union that the arbitrator's authority to impose a remedy is implied
where not expressly denied would be a denial of the consensual basis
of arbitration since the agreement was not drafted in contemplation of
such a rule. The Fifth Circuit opinion considers the dilemma presented by collective bargaining agreements which fail to completely
define the arbitrator's authority but suggests no rule of law providing a
solution. 7 Consequently, the decision alerts parties to collective bargaining agreements of the practical necessity of contract provisions
clearly spelling out their intent with respect to arbitration.
Although the failure of the union and the company involved in the
Continental Oil case to set forth the arbitrator's authority with sufficient definiteness and clarity may have resulted from inadvertence, it
appears more likely that the company and the union never in fact
reached a definite agreement on the issue. If such were the case the
decision appears correct since a court is unable to add to the parties'
agreement in this respect and still recognize that arbitration is based
upon the consent of the parties. It has been suggested that failure to
reach a definite agreement on the question of the arbitrator's authority
often results from the reluctance of the negotiating parties to risk an
impasse and that both sides prefer to execute incomplete agreements in
the hope that they will be interpreted favorably.' The Continental Oil
case serves notice to employers and employee representatives of the
need to face the problem at the bargaining sessions and resolve it in the
CHARLES Q. KAMIPS
collective bargaining agreement.
15 The dissenting opinion contains the following language: The idea of a person
deciding a controversy so that his decision may then become the subject of a
new and further one - i.e., controversy in bargaining - is repugnant to the
scheme of an orderly disposition of disputes before they ripen into the seeds
of industrial conflict. Refinery Employees v. Continental Oil Co., supra
note 4, 44 LRRM at 2398. This would appear to be justified criticism of an
agreement precluding the arbitrator from providing a remedy but not of a
decision enforcing such an agreement.
16 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
17 Where reasonable minds could not differ as to the appropriate remedy for a
contract violation, the arbitrator's authority to determine the remedy might
still be in doubt but not questioned since nothing could be gained by litigation.
Is Sooner or later an employer and his employees must strike some kind of a
bargain. The costs of disagreement are heavy. The pressure to reach agreement is so great that the parties are often willing to contract although each
knows that the other places a different meaning upon the words and they
share only the common intent to postpone the issue and take a gamble upon an
arbitrator's ruling if decision is required. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 at 1491 (1959).

